Replication materials for "Partisan Distribution of Ministerial Portfolios in Asian-Pacific Democracies", Party Politics
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Software


Analyses were carried out using Stata version 14.2 and R version 4.2.2


Data 


data_stata_pp.dta  -  Dataset for the main analysis and the supplementary analysis


Codebooks


Codebook_pp.pdf  -  Codebook for the dataset data_stata_pp.dta


Stata files

model1_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy (with coalition-level clusters) [Main Text: Table 1 Model 1]

model2_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy and different levels of legislature power (with coalition-level clusters) [Main Text: Table 1 Model 2]

model3_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy and different levels of party system institutionalization (with coalition-level clusters) [Main Text: Table 1 Model 3]

model4_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy and different levels of veto players (with coalition-level clusters) [Main Text: Table 1 Model 4]

model2_pp_f1_1.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the formateur bonus is conditioned by the legislature power in presidential systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Main Text: Figure 1 (a)]

model3_pp_f1_2.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the formateur bonus is conditioned by party system institutionalization in presidential systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Main Text: Figure 1 (b)]

model4_pp_f1_3.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the formateur bonus is conditioned by veto players in presidential systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Main Text: Figure 1 (c)]

model2_pp_f2_1.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the relationship between the party size and the portfolio share is conditioned by the legislature power in presidential systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Main Text: Figure 2 (a)]

model3_pp_f2_2.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the relationship between the party size and the portfolio share is conditioned by party system institutionalization in presidential systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Main Text: Figure 2 (b)]

model4_pp_f2_3.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the relationship between the party size and the portfolio share is conditioned by veto players in presidential systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Main Text: Figure 2 (c)]

model1_country_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy (with country-level clusters) [Supplementary: Table A.6 Model1]

model2_country_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy and different levels of legislature power (with country-level clusters) [Supplementary: Table A.6 Model2]

model3_country_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy and different levels of party system institutionalization (with country-level clusters) [Supplementary: Table A.6 Model3]

model4_country_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy and different levels of veto players (with country-level clusters) [Supplementary: Table A.6 Model4]

model1_re_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy (with country-level clusters, Random Effects) [Supplementary: Table A.8 Model1]

model2_re_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy and different levels of legislature power (with country-level clusters, Random Effects) [Supplementary: Table A.8 Model2]

model3_re_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy and different levels of party system institutionalization (with country-level clusters, Random Effects) [Supplementary: Table A.8 Model3]

model4_re_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy and different levels of veto players (with country-level clusters, Random Effects) [Supplementary: Table A.8 Model4]

model4_alt_pp.do  -  Stata code, OLS regression model estimating how portfolio shares are influenced by the formateur and the party size under different types of democracy and different levels of veto players (with country-level clusters; independent judiciary and independent sub-federal units not considered) [Supplementary: Table A.9 Model4]

model2_pp_f1_1_parl.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the formateur bonus is conditioned by the legislature power in parliamentary systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Supplementary: Figure A.1 (a)] 

model3_pp_f1_2_parl.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the formateur bonus is conditioned by party system institutionalization in parliamentary systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Supplementary: Figure A.1 (b)] 

model4_pp_f1_3_parl.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the formateur bonus is conditioned by veto players in parliamentary systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Supplementary: Figure A.1 (c)] 

model2_pp_f2_1_parl.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the relationship between the party size and the portfolio share is conditioned by the legislature power in parliamentary systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Supplementary: Figure A.2 (a)] 

model3_pp_f2_2_parl.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the relationship between the party size and the portfolio share is conditioned by party system institutionalization in parliamentary systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Supplementary: Figure A.2 (b)] 

model4_pp_f2_3_parl.do  -  Stata code, marginal effects plot demonstrating how the relationship between the party size and the portfolio share is conditioned by veto players in parliamentary systems (with coalition-level clusters) [Supplementary: Figure A.2 (c)] 


R code files


govform_pp.R  -  1) R code for Table 1 in the main text and its Durbin-Watson test results (Table A.10) in supplementary materials. 2) R code for Table A.7 (Fixed effects models) in supplementary materials.

